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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. L. Ro:\I.XEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
CovEY GARAGE, a corporation,
Defe~dant and AppellO!fl.t,

Case No. 6243

AMERICAN EQUITABLE AssURANCE
CoMPAXY, a corporation,
Interpleaded Defendant
and Respondent.

Btief of Respondent, E. L. Romney

E. L. Romney brought an action to recover damages
resulting from the theft of his car from the Covey
Garage. The case was tried by the court sitting without
a jury and the jndginent was in favor of the plaintiff
for $71 :J together with costs and interest from which the
Covey Garage has appealed. The plaintiff alleged and
the trial con rt found the damage resulted from defendant'~ negligence.
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Prior to trial the defendant interpleaded the American Equitable Assurance Company and it vvas regularly served with an order of court ordering it to appear and set forth its claims, if any, against Covey
Garage. It did not appear and the trial court in its
judgn1ent held that it had no claim against the defendant. Defendant alleged, but did not prove, that the
American Equitable Assurance Company paid the
plaintiff the reasonable damage to his car under an insurance policy, and was subrogated to his rights against
Covey Garage. Since it was made a party to the action
and asserted no claim against either defendant or plaintiff its relationship, if any, with the plaintiff is in no
way involved here.
On Saturday, April 30, 1938, at about 10:30 P. M.,
E. L. Romney of Lo-gan, Utah, left his car for storage
at the· ·Covey Garage, which accepted the car for a consideration to be paid and delivered a claim check to Mr.
Romney. The attendant was requested to fill the car
with gasoline. The keys were left in the car to enable
the garage employee to put in the gas and park it in the
garage. It was the practice of the garage to park the
cars in' the garage and deliver them to the owner when
called for. (Tr. 45-49)
At -the time the car was left there was a dance at the
dance hall, the entrance to the dance hall being about 20
yards south of the entrance to the garage. There were
a lot of· people milling around on the sidewalk in front
of the garage.
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About 11 :30 P. ~1. the car was stolen by a ma,n
named Freeman and driven out of the garage and
wrecked. ~Ir. R01nney tendered the defendant the payment for the stor.age and gasoline. (Tr. 51)
\Yhen .Jir. Romney's car was delivered to the garage, there were three attmtdants on duty - Steele
Remington, l{enneth Jones and Ben Baxter. These men
received, parked and deliYered cars and sold gas and oil.
The garagl' ne\·er closes. ( Tr. 55) Plaintiff's Exhilbit
"A" (picture) sho\YS a front view of the garage which
has two main front entrances, a wash rack and a room
which ·has a door leading into the garage. The opening
just south of the two main entrances is a wash rack.
There are doors which can be closed in front of
the wash rack. Two of the three attendants on duty at
the garage testified they did not know whether the doors
to the wash rack were closed or not between ten and
eleven-thirty P. M. on the night of the theft. They did
not know whether or not there were any cars parked in
front of the wash rack. (Tr. 58)
1

Whenever there is anybody going in the garage the
attendants usually stop them and ask them what they
want if they see then1. They do not usually let anybody
in the garage who doesn't have any business in there.
( Tr. 59) Occasionally some one starts into the garage
and the attendants stop them.
There i~ a rear door to the garage which is on the
north side. The man who takes care of the government
mail truek::; close:-; it and locks it after 10 P. M. One of
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the boys on duty usually cheeks this door but no particular attendant has this duty. The two attendants who
testified (Baxter and Remington) do not recall checking
this door on the evening of April 30, 1938. (Tr. 60)
There is an entrance that goes through the garage
and comes -out on 5th South Street, but the door is always padlocked. The witnesses did not know whether
this door was locked or not on the evening of April 30th.
(Tr. 61)
the
the
the
the
the

The three attendants were standing together near
door of the office -on the right side of the drive when
Romney car was driven out. Two people were in
front seat. There were about 115 cars stored in
garage that evening. Unless requested otherwise
keys are left in all cars. (Tr. 63)

There was as always a line of cars parked on the
service platfor·m just s·outh -of the wash rack-( extreme
south in the picture). There were about 4 ears there the
evening of April 30th. They are parked with the nose
pointing south. The witnesses did not know ·whether
the wash rack door was open or closed on the night of
the theft.'
The opening at the extreme left of the picture is a
little room with a door in the back which is always kept
loic:ked. (Tr. 68) The man who takes ca.re of the governrnent mail trucks ha.s a key to t;.he north back door. H1

drives the government cars in between seven and ter
P. M. and parks them on the upper flo-or. If the attend
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ants didn't know the people (who were going into the
garage) and they were going clear to the back of the
garage, we usually went with them. (Tr. 72)
The lavatory for the garage was just inside the
north entrance. On dance nights a number of people use
the rest rooms at the garage----a lot of people use it who
have no cars parked there. The attendants usually
watched them to see where they went and to see that
they came back out. The attendants don't stop what
they are doing lbut they observe as closely as they can
every one coming ·back out. There is a ladies' rest room
and a gentlemen's rest room inside the garage. (Tr. 74)
The man \Yho parked the government cars is named
Slim. He is a mechanic. and worked on the ,cars during
the evening. The garage also has a key to the north
back entrance. It is kept on the register. T.he witnesses
did not know who else has a key. (Tr. 77) The occupant
of the part of the building which faces on 5th South
Street has a key to the door which communicates between
the garage proper and the occupant's part of the building. The witnesses did not know who had the keys to
the door between the garage and the sales room on 5th
South Street. It was stipulated that the witness, Kenneth Jones, would testify substantially as the witness,
Steele Remington. ( Tr. 78)
Mr. C. B. Squires testified that on the evening of
February 26, 1938, which was Saturday, he parked his
car at the defendant's garage and when he called for
it the next morning it was not there, and he was told by
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the attendant at the garage that his car had been driven
out the previous evening. (Tr. 40) This evidence was
material. It shows that the defendant knew that a car
had recently been stolen from the garage. It was a circumstance to be considered by the trial court in determining whether or not the defendant exercised reasonable care in the protection of the Romney car.

The foregoing narration of the facts, together with
the inferences which may reasonably be supported thereby show ample support for the findings and judgment of
the -trial court. They show a number of probable ways
in which the thieves could have entered the garage, any
one of which would support the finding of the trial court
that the defendant was negligent.
The evidence supports the inference that the thieves
were able to use the cars parked at the south end of the
service platform as a screen to shield their entrance by
means of the wash rack door from the view of the attendants. The witnesses who testified did not know whether
or :not the door to the wash rack was closed on the evening of the theft. It had been open during the day and
there is no evidence that it was actually closed. This
court can not say as a matter of law that it would not
be :negligent to permit that door to be left open or unlocked with iCars parked so near it that persons wishing
to enter the garage unobserved could go in behind the
cars. On this, as well as other theories of the facts plain·
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
tiff made a prima facie case and made the decision a
question of fact. G pon the prima facie case being 1nade
the burden of proceeding (is distinguished frOin the ultimate burden of proof) shifted to the defendant. This
court can not say the burden thus shifted to defendant
has been discharged by such clear and convincing testimony that no reasonaible mind ;could find to the contrary.
Let us no\Y consider the testimony regarding the
rest room. It was located inside the garage doors and
was used by patrons of the garage and others. The
thieves may have gone to the rest room and. from there
to the garage. The attendants "usually" watch people
who go in. No particular attendant is charged with this
duty and they do not stop what they are engaged in
doing at the time to be sure that such persons leave the
building after using the toilet. This evidence supports
an inference that the thieves may have entered the garage on the pretext of using the toilet and instead of
leaving as they entered, got into the Romney car and
drove away.
There is a door on the north side of the garage
through which the government mail trucks are parked
in the garage. The attendants who testified did not know
whether or not this door was locked on the evening of
the theft. The man who parked these mail trucks had
a key to this door. He was not an employee of the garage.
It can not be said as a matter of law that it is not negli-

gent to permit a third party to have a. key to a garage
which holds itself out as a bailee for hire of many thouSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

sands of dollars worth of automobiles with keys in them
so they can be driven out of the open front door. Counsel
for defendant suggest at page 34 of their brief that the
thief may have entered by ''entering while the post office mechaniic was running mail trucks in the back way."
It .can not be said as a matter of law that the garage was
not negligent in so eonducting its business that the thief
may have entered in that manner.
The record also shows there is. an entrance to the
garage or storage portion of the building through the
sales room which fronts on 5th South Street. The attendants testified there was a board partition between
this sales room and the storage room with a door through
the partition. This door had a padlock on the storage
side. The attendants did not know whether or not this
door was locked on the evening of the theft. (Tr. 6~1) An
appellate court will not hold as a matter of law that a
garage has exercised due care when it has a door entering into the storage room from the business premises of
a third party and the attendants on duty at the garage·
on the evening of the theft do not know whether or not
the door is locked on the evening of the theft. The testilnony of the attendants showed that no one was particularly charged with the duty of inspecting any of the
four entrances aside from the two main entrances to
see if they were locked. No one was particularly charged
with the duty of watching to see that persons who entered the garage to use the toilet returned to the outside.
No one was particularly charged with the duty of watchSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing to see that no trespasser used the cars parked at
the south end of the :;erYice platfonn as a shield to screen
an entrance by way of the wash rack door which may
have been open on the evening· of the theft.
This is a law case and if tliere is sufficient evidence
to support the findings and judgment of the trial court
they will not be distur>bed on appeal. In B. T. Morarn,
Inc., v. First Security Corporation, 82 U. 316, 24 Pacific
2d 384, the court said :
''This is a law action tried to the court without a
jury, and for that reason this court may not
weigh the evidence and itself make findings.
We may merely examine the record to determine whether there is sufficient competent
evidence to support the findings of the trial
court, and, if such is found, then it becomes
our duty to sustain the findings.''
If reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not
defendant was negligent, the judgment ·Of the trial eourt
must be sustained.

I.
UNDER THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.

Rogers v. Murch, 149 N. E. 202, was decided by the
.Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1925. It was an
artion in 'c:ontraet or tort to reeover the value of an automobile stolen from defendant's garage. A window, large
enough when open for a person to get through the lower
half, led to the basement of the building. There was
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eivdence that there were locks for all the doors and windows, but
''no testimony tha·,t the windo1vs and doors on toot
particular night were in faret locked other
than could be inferred from evidence that it
was the pr(J)ctice for a wif;rn;ess to lock them
before leaving at night."

The court said there was evidence which would warrant
a finding that the basement window was not loeked on
the night the theft occurred. There was a verdict for
plaintiff in the trial court and the Supreme Court held
that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict
and said:
"The request for a ruling that 'there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant and the plaintiff cannot recover' was
refused rightly. In consideration of all the
evidence and particularly of the value ·of the
.cars which were daily housed, of the ease of
entering the premises, and of opening the
large door, the jury could properly find that
reasonable care and prudence required that
the premises should have been more securely
safeguarded by other or additional locks, or
if such was not feas~ble, by a night watch·
man.''
The Rogers case cleari:· illustrates the ease with
which the plaintiff in such a case establishes prima facie
proof of negligence and casts upon the defendant the
burden of producing evidence to rebut the prima facie
case of the plaintiff. There it was shown to be the practice for some one to lo.ck the doors and windows before
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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leaving at night, but the court held that the nbsence of
eddence tliat the doors and windows were in fact locked
on the night of the theft coupled \Yith the entrance by
the thief justified the jury in finding that the window
'vas not locked on the night in question and that reasonable care \\·as not exerl'ised hy defendant.
Harding r. Shapiro, 206 K. ,r. 168 (Minnesota Supreme Court 19:25). The trial court, sitting without a
jury decided in favor of plaintiff. The sliding door
through which the thieYes gained entrance was secured
by a three-eighths inch chain fastened by a padlock. The
testimony for defendant showed that after the theft,
which ·I)CCurred in the night time, the chain was found
to :havP been cut, supposedly by a bolt cutter. The court
said:
"Under the rule of such cases as Hoel v. Flour
City Fuel & Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 280, 175
N. "~. 300, and Steenson v. Flour City Fuel
& Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 375, 175 N. W.
681, the lburden was upon defendant to prove
that the loss ·of the property bailed with him
was not the result of his negligence. As stated
in the Hoel Case, it was not for him merely
to go forward with the evidence, but he had
'the burden of proving to the jury that the
loss did not come frorn his negligence.'
"It is a 'matter of eommon knowledge that
burglars are accustomed to look over the
ground of their operations in advance. Door
and window fastenings as nearly burglar
proof as may be are discouraging to them.
On the other hand, insecure and easily broken
fastenings may amount to an invitation. It
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1s so easy to cut a three-eighths inch chain
even though it be of steel, that it would b~
presumptuous for us to say as a matter of
law that the use of such a chain, exposed as
was this one to burglarious attack, to protect
property stored with a bailee for hire, is due
care as a matter of law. We consider the
question one of fact. For that reason we
decline to interfere with the decision for
plaintiff.
''Order affirmed.''
The Harding case presented a fact situation much
more favorable for the defendant in that case tha'n the
situation in the Romney case, but the court still held
the question involved was one of fact and not of law.
Reasonable men might believe the defendant in that case
was negligent and it is obvious that reasonalble men
might believe the defendant was negligent in the case
at bar.

Baione v. Heavey, 158 A. 181 (!Superior Court of
PHnnsylvania 193'2). The ·rase was in trespass for negligently caring for plaintiff's automobile. Defendant
conducted a parking lot on an unfenced vacant corner
in Philadelphia. It was the practi>c.e to leave the keys
in the car. Plaintiff had parked his car there forty or
fifty times before and was familiar with the method of
doing business. He parked his car at 9 P. M., and at
11 P.M., when he called for it, the car could not be found.
The defendant had seven employees beside his manager
at work. The trial court held the defendant was neglige-nt. The Superior Court affirmed this decision.
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'"Xor have we any doubt that the evidence was
sufficient to justify the trier of fact to find
that defendant was negligent in the care of
the car. \Yhen plaintiff presented the ticket,
it was defendant's duty to obtain the car
from the pla.ce where his employee had· put
it, and deliver it to plaintiff; he could not
deliver it, nor could he explain what had become of it consistently with the performance
of the duty assun1ed by him in the circumstances."
Wendt v. Sley System Garages, 188 A. 624 ( Superior
Court Pa. 1936). The plaintiff drove his car into an open
parking lot operated by defendant. When he returned
for it he found it had been stolen. The defendant testified that six attendants were employed and according to
one of them four were on duty all that day until after
the theft occurred. At times one or more of the attendants were driving cars to be washed and greased which
required them to be taken about ten !blocks. The plaintiff stated that when he called to get his .car, he saw only
two attendants present on the lot.
1

After quoting from the decision in B aione v. I-I eavey,
supra, holding the question of negligence was for the
trier of the facts, the court said:
''This ruling is in accordance with the text in
6 C. J. 1158, section 160, which reads as follows : 'The rule adopted in the more modern
decisions is that the proof ·Of loss or injur~,
establishes a sufficient prima facie case
against the bailee to put him upon his defense. Where chattels are delivered to a
bailee in good condition and are returned in
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a dainaged state, or are lost or not returned
at all, the law presumes negligence to be the
,cause, and casts upon the bailee the burden
of showing that the loss is due to other
eauses consistent with due care on his part.'
We cited, with approval, this rule in O'Malley v. Penn Athletic Club, 119 Pa. Super.
584, 181 A. 370. It is also favorably commented upon by text writers. Berry on Automobiles (7th Ed.) pp. 744, 745, section 537,
states that, if a machine is stolen while in
the possession of a bailee, a presumption
arises that :he was negligent in cari'ng for it,
and all that is incumbent upon the bailor to
make out a prima facie case is to prove the
bailment and that the automobile was lost
while in the Jbailee 's possession; that 'it is
then the duty of the bailee to "go forward"
with proof to S'how that he used proper care
in the bailment, in the absence of which
proof the bailor is entitled to judgment.'
'·'The evidence offered in this case shows that the
parking lot operated by defendant is on the
northeast .corner of Twentieth and Market
streets, Philadelphia, fronting 160 feet on
Market street and running back to a depth
of 180 feet to Commerce street, with a capacity of 240 to 250 cars. The plaintiff parked
his car, fronting Twentieth street, from which
point a car could be driven across the pavement into the street. There were 30 to 50
cars parked, facing that way. The defenda'nt testified that six attendants were employed, and, according to one of them, four
were on duty all that day prior to 5:30, but
at times one or more of them were driving
cars to be washed or greased, which required
thmn to be taken a distance of a bout ten
bl01c:ks. The plaintiff stated that, when he
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called 'to get his car, he saw only' two attendants prese·nt on the lot.
''We are of the opinion· that the evidence was sufficient to justify the trial judge in finding that
the bailee was negligent in not exercising due
care in safeguardi'ng the bailor's car.
''A full consideration of this evidence and argument of learned counsel convinces us that the
plaintiff is entitled to his judgment.
''Judgment affirmed.''
In 1927 the Supreme Court of Illinois decided Bya'los
v. Mat~heson, 159 N. E. 242~ The case in the appellate
court is reported in 243 Ill. App. 60. Plaintiff left his
car at defendant's garage one evening and when he called
for it the next morning it was not there. Plaintiff and
defendant went to the police station and reported that
the car had· been stolen. About a week later it was
recovered in Racine, Wisconsin. There was no other
evidence of the negligence· of defendant. The court said
that "so far as the· record' shows (the plaintiff) could
have had no knowledge of the circumstances of the theft''
and held the plaintiff's "proof made a prima facie case"
and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff.
"The appellee and the appellant were t4e onl.y
witnesses. The material facts are that Hyman Byalos, the appellee, kept his Velie automobile at the appellant's garage. .A!bout 7
o'clock in the evening of January 30, 19'2'5,
he left the .car at the garage for the night,
and when he called for it the next morning
it was not there. The appellant and the appellee went together to the police station to
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take out a warrant and reported that the car
had been stolen.
"The appella:nt contends it was obligatory upon
the appellee to prove the bailee was guilty of
negligence, and that there was an entire failure to prove negligence. The appellee testified he left the car in the appellant's garage
at 7 o'clock in the evening of January 30. He
called for it next morning and it was not
there. He subsequently ascertained it had
been stolen. So far as the record shows, he
could have had no knowledge of the circumstances of the theft. In the early case of
Cumins v. Wood, 44 Ill. 416, 9·2 Am. De~c. 189,
the court held that, where the bailor shows
he has sto·red goods in good condition with
the bailee and they were returned to him damaged or not returned at all, the law presumes
negligence of the bailee, unless he shows the
loss did not result from his negligence. Schaefer v. Safety Deposit Co., 281 Ill. 43, 117
N. E. 781, Ann. Cas. 1i918C, 906; Miles v. International Hotel Co., 289 Ill. 3·20, 124 N. E.
599. The appellee's proof made a prima facie
case, a:nd no proof was offered by the appellant that he was not guilty of negligence.''
1

In M edes v. H ornbao.h, 6 F'ed. 2d 711, the court of
appeals of the District of Columbia reversed the decision
of the municipal court which held the defendant garage
not negligent under the evidence.

The appellate court

held the plaintiff had made a prima

fa~c:ie

case:

''Nevertheless, when the proof establishes that a
stored car, while in charge of the garage
keeper, :has been taken ·out and used by an
emplo~yee of the latter, without the knowledge
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or consent of the owner, and has been damaged by such use, such proof, standing al_one
unexplained, is sufficient to make out a I?r1~a
facie case for a recovery by the plaintiff.
Knights v. Piella, 111 Mich. 9, 60 N. W. 92,.;
66 An1. St. Rep. 375; Hadley v. Orchard, 7 I
Mo. App. 1-!1; Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N.Y. 260,
31 Am. Rep. -±67 : Staley v. Colony Co. (Tex.
CiY. App.), 163 S. \Y. 381; Colburn v. Art
Ass 'n, 80 \Yash. 662, 141 P. 1153, L~. R. A.
1913A, 59±; Travelers' Indemnity Co. v.
Fa-wkes, 120 Minn. 353, 139 N. W. 703, 45
L. R. A. (N". S.) 331; Handley v. O'Gorman,
45 R.I. 242, 121 A. 399.
'' \Y e think that, under the rules just stated, the
evidence in this case made out a prima. facie
case for a recovery by the plaintiff, and that
it was error for the lower court to render
judgment upon it for the defendant."
Appellant takes the position that the ultimate burden
of proof is on the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff assumed
and discharged the burden of proving neglige'nce, this
question is of no importance upon appeal. The only
question before this court is whether or not the judgment
finds support in the testimony. If this court decides, as
we respectfully submit it will decide, that reasonable
minds might differ as to whether or not defendant exercised reasonable care for the protection of plaintiff's
automobile, the judgment !below must be affirmed.
The confusion in the cases regarding the burden of
proof in actions like this one arises from the tenden1cy
of some courts to attempt to decide what is really a question of ''policy and fairness based on experience in the
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different situations" (as stated b~' Dean Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol. DT., Sec. 2486) by resort to a legal rule as
a "Oe.neral solvent for. a 1l cases~" An illustration will
clarify this point. Suppose a bailor delivers 100 cattle
to a bailee to be grazed upon the bailee's. unfenced cattle
range. The bailee's duty is to prevent the cattle frolll
straying beyond the domain owned by him. When the
cattle are returned to the bailor at the end of six months
5 head are missing. In a suit by the bailor it seems
obvious that the mere fact of disappearance of tbe cattle
while in the technical possession of the bailee would not
create any presumption of negligence. And if the cattle
had been stolen from a range covering thousands of acres.
the situation with regard to !burden of proof should be
the same. The plaintiff should :have the burden of showing some additional facts to create a prima facie case
and shift to defendant bailee the burden of showing .due
care.
But when a bailor delivers an automobile to a large
modern garage, enclosed in a building· with three attendants and pays a fee to have it protected and a thiefenters
the building presumably while the atte-ndants are on: dut~'
and drives the car away and wrecks it, considerations of
''fairness based on experience'' should properly hold the
plaintiff has made a prima facie .case and the burden of
rebuttal then shifts to the bailee.· The fact of the theft
of the bailed property may or may not rebut the prima
fEicie case created by the bailment and the failure toreturn, depending upon the facts of the bailment and 'the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l~J

facts of the theft. The purpo~e of a trial is to establish
justice :between the parties, and under the spirit of the
code pleading reforms abolishing foi~ms of aetion, it is
a sacrifice of substance to mere form to answer the question of burden of proof by resort to the form of the
action-whether in contract or tort.
Counsel for appellant quote at length from 81cain v.
Ttciu City 1llotor Co., 127 S. E. 560. The court there held
the defendant had the burden of the evide-nlce-that is
that the fact of the theft while in the cu-stody of ·the
bailee made a prima facie case for plaintiff. The defendant discharged its burden by proving the theft occurred
without its negligence. The court said:
''The general prindple g-overning liability as pronounced in this state is contained in Beck v.
\Yi1kins..!Ricks Co., 179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E.
313, 9 A. L. R. 554, as follows: 'The defendant as bailee assumed liability of ordinary
care for the safekeeping and the return of
the machine to the bailor in good condition.
The bailee did not assume liability as insurer, a·nd therefore did not bec.ome lia!ble for
the nonreturn of the property in good condition if he observed the ordinary care devolved upon him by reason of the baiJ.ment.
If the machine had been injured or stolen or
destroyed by fire while in his custody, the
defendant would not be liable if such care
had been observed. On the other hand, the
mere fact fha'f the property had been. destroyed by fire or stolen did not absolve him
front resp{)lnsibil ity, any more than he would
. have been absoh·ed 'if it had been injured in
his custody, Ulnless he had shown that he had
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us~d the care required of him

by virtue of his
* "'' 'The rule adopted in the
more modern decisions is that the proof of
loss or injury establishes a sufficient prima
f~.cie case against the bailee to put him upon
h1s defense. Where chattels are delivered
to a bailee in good condition and are returned
in a damaged state, or are lost or not returned at all, the law presumes negligence
to be the cause, and casts upon the bailee the
burden of showing that the loss is due to
other causes consistent with due care on hiR
part.' " See Ha:nes v. :Shapiro, 168 N.C. 24,
84 S. E. 33; Hutchins v. Taylor Buick Co., 198
N. C. 777, 153 S. E. 397.
ba.~lment.

*

''Practically all courts are in a~ccord upon the
proposition t'hat if the owner of an automobile carries it to a garage in good condition,
for service furnished by such garage, and
thereafter such bailee fails to return it, or
returns it in a damaged cundition, he makes
out a prima facie case, nothing else appearing, and is therefore entitled to have the jury
determine the proper issues. But, suppose
it should appear from the plaintiff's evideme.
or if the fact ·was uncontroverted, that while
in such garage tbe ear was struck by lightning or the employees of the garage were
held up by an armed highwayman and the
~car was taken from the custodv of the bailee,
·who was otherwise exercising"ordinary care,
it would hardly be supposed that under such
circumstances the law required the solemn
formality of submitting issues upon such admitted facts."
·
T:he Swain case cites the following North Carolina
cases and in each it is held the bailee has the burden of
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the evidence upon proof of the loss. None of them base
this ruling upon the form of the pleading.
Beck v. ll"ilkins-Ri.cks Co., 102 S. E. 313;
Hanes v. Shap·iro, 8-! S. E. 33;
Hntchins v. Taylor Buick Co., 153 S. E. 39 7.
1

The court in the Beck case, supra, quotes the follow•
ing from 6 Corpus Juris, Section 160:
''Reasons of Rule.-(1) '.Since the bailor is generally at a disadvantage in olbtainlng accurate
information of the cause of the loss or damage, the law considers he makes out a case
for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur by proof of the bailme:nt and the failure of the bailee to deliver the property on
proper demand.' Corbin v. Cleaning Co., 181
Mo. App. 1'51, 155, 167 S. W. 1145. (2) 'The
rule rests upon the consideration that, where
the ·bailee has exclusive possession, the facts
attending loss or injury must be peculiarly
within his own knowledge. Besides, the failure to return the property, or its return in
an injured condition, constitutes the violation of a contract, and it devolves upon the
bailee to excuse or justify the breach.' Nutt
v. Davison, 54 Colo. 586, 588, 13;1 Pa1c. 391,
44 L. R. A. (N. S..) 1170. (3) 'The rule is
founded in necessity and upon the presumption that a party who, from his situation, has
peculiar, if not exclusive, knowledge of facts,
if they exist, is best able to prove them. If
the bailee, to whose possession, control and
care of the goods are intrusted, will not account for the failure or refusal to deliver
them on demand of the bailo-r, the presumpSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion is not violent that 'he has been wanting
in diligence, or that he may have wrongfully
converted or may wrongfully detain them;
or if there be injury to or loss of them during
the bailment, it is but just that he be required
to show the circumstances, acquitting himself of the want of diligence it was his dutv
to bestow.' Davis v. Hurt, 114 Ala. 146, 150,
21 South. 469·, 'quoted in Hackney v. Perry,
152 Ala. 6'2·6, 44 S.outh. 1029, 1031. ''
The very recent ·California case of Travelers Fire
Insura;nce Co. v. Brock wnd Co . , 85 .Pac. 2d 905 .(District
Court of Appeal-hearing denied by Supreme Court Feb.
20, 1939), contains the foHowing terse statement of the
rule:
''The :burden of proof rests with .the bailee to
prove, where ~he bailed property is not returned to the bailor, that the property was
lost by theft, etc., without negligence ·Of the
bailee. U Drive & Tour, Ltd., v. System Auto
Parks, Ltd., Cal. Super., 71 P. 2d 3·54, 356."
The proof of t'l~eft of bailed property may or may
not shift the burden or' the evidence from the bailee back
t·o the ·bailor, depending upon all the facts and circumstances .. U:nder the facts in the case at bar the fact of
the theft in view of all the other facts in evidence created
a prima facie case for the plaintiff and shifted the burden of the evidence to the defendant.

If the case had

been tried before a jury, plaintiff "~as entitled to go to
the jury. The evidence sustains the judgment which
should be affir:rp.ed .by the court.
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As shown by the cases herein there is sulbstantial
and respertable authority for the eontention that upon
proof of bailment and failure to return the ultimate burden ,of proof shifts to the bailee. Since the evide-nce in
the case at bar supports an inferenc.e of negligence the
question of whether or not the ultimate burden of proof
shifts is not here involn:-d. All the cases, including those
cited by appellant agree upon the proposition that evidence of the circumstances shown in the case at bar create
a prima facie case and shift the burden of proceeding to
the bailee. Or stated in another way, such evidence supports a judgment for the bailor.

Counsel for appellant cite Galo1citz v. Magner, 203
X. Y. S. 421. The California District Court of Appeals
in Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, 29·3 Pa1c:. 821,
quote with approval from the Magner case the following:
"It seen1s to me obvious that plaintiff had the
right to believe, from the fact that defendant maintained an inclosed space for parking cars, W'ith an entrance and exit and attendants, that he was paying the parking fee
in consideration of care and watchfulness to
prevent injur~ or loss. Otherwise he might
almost as well have parked upon the public
street and saved the fee. * * *

"The proof in this case is very meager, but is in
n1y opinion sufficient to present a question
of fact for the jury. Where a space is inclosed by an 8-foot !board fence, for parking
cars, with an entrance and an exit, a checking system, and three attendants to look after
and take care of the cars as they ca!me in and
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went out, the jury might infer that the theft
of plaintiff'!:3 car could not have occurred had
defendant and his employees properly performed their duty. Indeed, it seems to me
that such inference is well-nigh irresistible,
ber.ause some one must have taken out plaintiff's car without presenting a check or ticket
therefor,
and to permit this was clearly ne0'0
.
11gent.''
The judgment in the Magner case was set aside and
remanded for new tri~l upon the ground the complaint
failed to allege negligence and because the trial court
instructed the jury that the burden rested upon the defendant to show that the theft did not occur through
want of due care on his part. This holding is criticized
hy the author of the note in 48 A. L. R. 385:
"It seems fairly open to question whether the interpretation which the court _put upon the instruction in the last .c:ase is the correct one, as
placing· the burden of proof of due care on
the defendant. Rather, the contention seems
plausible that this instruction merely required the defendant to produce evidence to
overcome a prima facie case arising from the
loss of the property. It is said that the complaint alleged, and the answer admitted, ~y
not denying, that the car was stolen. ~ut l_ll
case of theft of property from the ba1lee; 1f
the theft is admitted it seems that the ba1lee
ought to be requirea' to show the care wh~ch
he exercised to prevent the theft, assu~mg
that, after he overcomes the plaintiff's prnna
fa•cie case, the ultimate burden of proof rest.s
on the plaintiff, the bailor, to prove negligence.''
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The plaintiff, in J{cenau llotel Co. v. Ji'unk,111 N. E.
364, alleged a bailment of hi~ automobile at a public parking lot operated by defendant and that through defendantts negligence it was stolen. The court, sitting without
a jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff. The
evidence showed the !bailee required the bailor to leave
the keys in the car and said he would watch it. There
was no proof of "specific" negligence. T:he appellate
court held the bailor had established a prima facie ease
and affirmed the judg1nent for the bailor.
''This court will not weigh the evidence where it
is conflicting. If there is any evidence tending to support every essential fact necessary
to sustain the judgment, it is sufficient. It
is also the rule, that the court or jury trying
the cause may draw any reasonable inference
of fact :(rom the evidence. It is not essential
that a fact be proven by direct and positive
eYidence, but, where it may reasonably be
inferred from the facts and circumstances
whii(~h the evidence tends to establish, it will
be sufficient on appeal. Federal, etc., Co. v.
Sayre (1924), 19:5 Ind. 7, 142 N. E. 223. It is
only when there is no evidence on some essential element to sustain the judgment, or
to sustain any reasonable inferences in support thereof that this court would be justified in reversing a cause for want of evidence. Emerson, etc., Co. v. Tooley (19·23),
81 Ind. App. 460, 141 N. E. 890." .
'·'Where the burden of proof rests in cases of
this kind is a question upon vvhich the courts
are not in harmony. The rule in Indiana
however, a portion of '~lhich was quoted with
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tional Hotel Co. ( 1919), 289 Ill. 320, 1'24 N. E.
599, was very plainly set forth in this language: ' ''The weight of modern authority
holds the rule to be that, where the bailor has
sho\Yll that the goods were received in good
condition by the bailee and were not returned
to the !bailor on demand, the bailor has made
out a case of prima facie negligence against
the bailee, and the bailee n1ust show that the
loss or damage was caused \vithout ~his fault.
* * * The effect of this rule is, not to
shift the burden of proof from plaintiff to
the defendant, but simply the burden of proceeding.'' And such prima facie case is not
overcome by a showing on the part of the
bailee that the goods have been burned, or
otherwise destroyed or stolen. Before such
prima facie case Qan be said to be overcome,
the bailee must further produce evidence
tending to prove that the loss, damage, or
theft was occasioned without his fault. This
rule has been applied to garage keepers who
failed to return automobiles on demand.'
Employers', etc., Co. v. Consolidated, etc.,
Co. (19,27), 85 Ind. App. 674, 155 N. E. 535,
and authorities there cited.
"From an examination of the evidence in the record, keeping in mind the above rules as a
test of its suffi~iency to support the judgment, we do not find that there is a total want
of eviden<;e on any essential element necessary to make appellee's case.
''Judgment affirmed.,.,
In H·oel v. Flour City Fuel d!; Tra11sjer Co., 175 N. W.
300, the court said and held:
"In Rustad v. Great N. Ry. Co., 122 Minn. 453,
142 N. \V. 727, \Ve had the question of the
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liability of the railway company defendant as
a warehouseman for the loss of property in
its possession. ": e held that the burden of
proof was upon the defendant to shnw that
the loss did not con1e from its negligence;
that this !burden was not merely the burden
of going forward with proofs, nor a shifting
burden, but a burden of establishing before
the jur: that its negligence did not eause the
loss; and we referred with approval tn Dean
Wigmore's statement that the question of
where the burden of proof should rest is 'a
question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different sitnations.' '' ·
''The evidence was not such as to· require a finding that it was free of negligence and that the
loss did not come from its lack of care. The
evidence was only this, that the· defendant
could give no explanation of how the car go~
out of the garage. The jury, taking into consideration the manner in which the garage
was conducted, could find that if ca:re eommensurate with the situation had been used
it would not have disappeared."

In Federal Insurarn~e Co. v. Lindsley, 2·28 N; Y. S.
614, the court said:
''While the dismissal of the complaint seems ,,-arranted by the opinion in Claflin v. Meyer, 75
N. Y. 260, 31 Am. Rep. 467, it was subsequently held in Ouderkirk v. Central Nat. Bank
of Troy, 119 N. Y. 263, 23 N. E. 875, that the
burden of showing the circumstances of the
loss of the property rests upon the bailee, and
unless the evidence shows the exercise of due
care by him according to the nature of the
bailment he \vill be held responsible for the
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breach of his contract to return the property
bailed, and in Stewart v. 'Stone, 127 N. Y.
500, 28 N. E. 59'5, 14 L·. R. A. 215, that the
prima facie case made out hy failure to return the property bailed on demand may be
over1come, when it is made to appear that the
loss was occasioned by some misfortune or
accident not within the control of the bailee.
See, also, Greenberg v. Mermelstein (.Sup.),
188 N. Y. S. 250; Hobbie v. Ryan, 130 Misc.
Rep. 221, 2:23 N. Y. 18. 654. It follows that the
mere concession that the automobile was
stolen from defendant's garage did not destroy plaintiff's prima facie case, and it was
error to dismiss the complaint.''
1

In Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 188 P~c. 856, 55
U. 588, where the plaintiff sued for negligently failing to
care f.or plaintiff's baggage, and on the assumption that
the plaintiff \Vas a boarder to whom the duty of ordinary
care was due, this court held the evidence sustained the
finding and judgment for plaintiff. The evidence shorwed
merely that the plaintiff handed the grip to one of the
porters which was the last she ever saw of it. The hotel
manager charged the porters with being careless in respect to the property.
'''rCertainly this court, in view of such evidence
can not find that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding.''
Counsel for appellant cite Knights v. Piella! 69 N.
W. 9'2, decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan in
1896. In 1931 the same· court decided General Excha'fbge
Insura;n:ce Corpora1tion v. Service Parking Grounds, Inc.,
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235 N. "'· 898. In 1919 the Mi,chigan legislature enacted
the following statute:

''.Section 1. \YheneYer any damage s~all be done
to anY motor vehicle while in the possession
or un.der the eare, custody or control of the
owner, his agent or servant, or the k~eper of
any public garage or other establishment
where such vehicle shall have been accepted
for hire or gain, proof of such damage s·hall
be prima facie evidence that sueh damage
was the result of the negligent act of such
owner or keeper of the plaee where such
vehicle was stored.''
The court said this statute 1s declaratory of the
common law and held:
''The burden was on defendant not only to show
that the ·ear was stolen ,but also that the theft
took place without any negligence on its
part.''
The court cites and quotes from prior case of
Kn·ights v. Piella in support of its position ~hat while
the ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff the burden
of the evidence (overcoming plaintiff's prima facie case)
shifts to defendant. It is further held that the judgment
for defendant below found no support in the evidence
which showed negligence as a matter of law and ordered
judgment for plaintiff.
Counsel for appellant cite Stone v. Case, 124 Pa,c.

g,60. That case is reviewed in the later Oklahoma case
of Wheeler r. Packard OklJahoma Motor Co., 38 Pac. 2d
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943. Analysis of these' cases illustrates that the rule
therein announced is simply that the~ plaintiff' has thi
burden of establishing a prima facie case. If this prima
facie case is rehutted by uncontradicted testimony S()
strong that reasonable minds could not differ about it
the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. (As in
the Swain case, supra, and ·cited by appellant.) If the
rebuttal is itself only prima facie and reasonable minds
may differ as to what is proved the plaintiff without
further evidence is entitled to go· to the jury. In the last
situation the jury would be properly instructed that the
ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
Carefully considered, appellant's argument regarding the burden of proof amounts to no more than an
argument that if the case had been tried before a jury
the defendant would have been entitled to an instruction
tha:t the burden of satisfying the jury upon the question
of negligence \Yas upon the plaintiff. Suppose the defendant admits this proposition for the purpose of the
argument. The jury (the Judge in this case) was properly advised as to the• law and was satisfied by the preponderance of the evidence. The only· question ibefore
this court comes baclc to the same proposition: Could
reasonable mi11ds reach the ~conclusion reached by the
trial court.
There is, however, as shown ·herein substantial and
respectable authority for the eontention that if plaintiff
creates a prima facie case which is not rebutted by de·
fendant the ultimate burden of satisfying the jury bas
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been shifted to the defendant. "\Vhile plaintiff respL•dfully submits that his testimony created such a prima
facie case and there was no rebuttal by defendant tending- to show the exereise of ordinary care, and the plaintiff would therefore under the authority referred to have
been entitled to an instruction that the burden was on
defendant to prove freedom from negligence, since the
trial \Yas to the .court the question involved here on appeal is properly limited to the question of whether or not
the evidence supports the judgn1ent.
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Altmont Sprilngs
Hotel Co., 267 .S. W. 555, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held:

'' vV e think these facts developed a prima facie
case of negligence ag-ainst defendant, and that
the burden was upon it to show the requisite
care on its part to excuse it from liability.·''
The evidence showed the storage of the automolbile
in defendantts garage and its disappearance therefrom
during the nig~ht. The keys to the garage were in the
possession of defendant and it permitted its servants,
as well as other boarders, lodgers and guests, to use
those keys. In the case at bar the defendant permitted
the man who took care of the government mail trucks to
have keys to the noTth rear door of the garage. The
above case is followed in Blackbu.rn. v. Depoyster, 272
S. W. 398, decided by the same court and in Spare v.
Belroy Housing Corpora!tion, 38 Pac·. 2d 207, decided by
the Supreme Court of Washington.

See H utohins v.
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Taylor Buick Co., 153 8. E. 397; Employers Fire Ins.
Co. v. Consolidated Garage, 155 N. E. 533; Farrell Calhoun Co. v. U11ion Chevrolet Co., 113 S. W. 2d 419.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT

PROPEHLY

OVERRULED DEFENDANT'S

GENERAL AND SPECIAL DEMURRERS TO PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT.

Defendant's special demurrer was directed to the
sound discretion of the court. Obviously the manner in
which the thief entered defendant's garage was not
known by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not required to
plead the evidence by which 'he establishes the ultimate
fact of negligence.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged:
"That the defendant negligently and carelessly
failed to safel~- and securely keep said automobile but carelessly and negligently permitted the same to be taken and stolen from
said garage by Albert Freeman and Brady
1Vayne Poulson without the consent or authority or permission of the plaintiff or an~·
one acting on his behalf."
The garage and the .car were in defendant's possession. Its employees on duty at the time the car wa~
stolen testified "I haven't the slightest idea how Freeman and ·whoever was with him got inside the garage
that night. We have all been wondering and speculating as to how he got in.'' An argument that the plaintiff
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must allege and prove the specific manner in which the
thief got into defendant's garage when the defendant
itself, in possession of the garage, asserts H does not
know, defeats itself. All available facts were within the
knowledge and possession of the defendant.
The trial court's ruling on the special den1urrer will
not the reversed on appeal where, as here, the ruling did
not constitute an abuse of discretion and did not affect
the substantial rights of the adverse party.
The Utah statute provides:
Pleadings to be Liberally Oonstrued. In the construction of a pleading,
for the purpose of determining its effect, its
allegations must be liberally construed with
a view to substantial justice between the
parties.''

"104-13-1.

'''104-14-7. Only Prejudicial Errors and Defects

To Be Regarded. The court must in every
stage of an action disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties,
·and no judgment shall be reversed or affe.cted by reason of such error or defect.''
Prejudice Must Be Shown. No exception shall be regarded, unless· the decision
excepted to is material and prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the party excepting.''

'' 104-39-3.

In support of our position that the trial court did

TI'Ot err in overruling defendant's general demurrer we
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quote from Mangum

1i.

Bullion-, Etc., Mining Co., 15 U.

534:
''Under our system, the allegations of a pleadinO'
for the purpose of determin~ng its effect'
must be liberally construed, with a view t~
suhstantial justice between the parties. Camp.
Laws Utah 1888, Sec. 32.38. Nor can fhe objection to the complaint that the allegations
respecting the defective machinery and its
negligent operation were in general terms
avail the appellant. While these allegations
do not refer specifie1ally to the particular
parts of the machinery which were defective,
or specify with exactness wherein tbe machinery was operated carelessly, still we are
of the opinion that they would have been sufficien.t to resist a general demurrer before
trial, if one had been interposed, and hence
are sufficient to resist the attack that the
complaint did not state a cause of action,
made after verdict and judgment. * * *
Moreover, it does not appear that the plaintiff had such exact knowledge of the machinery and its operation as would enable him to
state just what particular parts were defective, or just wherein its operation was negligent. The general facts he could know, but
the particular facts were more likely to be
within the knowledge of the defendant, because of its duty to inspect the machinery
and keep it in repair. In such case less particularity in stating the specific facts, or th.e
acts or on1issions w'hich .constitute negli·
gence, is required. The .complainant may
know only the immediate cause of the injury,
and may be unable to state the precise acts
or things which caused it. If, therefore, the
facts alleged show such an occurrence as is
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usually the sequence of en reh'SSIJr•s:-:; or n~g·
li()'ence, it is incumbent upon the opposite
~
.
f
party to explain it, and show the exeW'Ise o
proper care : and the court in sue·h case will
not say, as matter of law, that the complaint
does not state a cause of action on the ground
of negligence.''
And in Eddi11gfon r. Cement Co., -!:2 U. 274, 130 Pac.
243, the court said :
"Unless it is clear that the complaint fails to
state some essential element necessary to a
cause of action, or that some facts are stated
by reason of which the plaintiff cannot recover because of some a,ct of his own, which
prevents a reeovery, a general demurrer
should always be overruled. Under our statute (Gomp. Laws 1907, sec. 2986) doubts, if
any arise, upon the allegations in the pleadings are not necessarily resolved against the
pleader; but the pleading, as provided in that
section, 'must be liberally construed.' No
reason is perceived why appellant cannot
prove a prima facie case under the allegations of his complaint.''
In Roster v. Inter-State Power Co., 237 N. W. 738,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota held:
"It is the settled rule that negligence may be set
forth in general terms, where the specific
facts are more largely within the knowledge
of the defendant. 8 R. C. L. 812; Bliss on
Code Pleading Sec. 310a : New York, C. &
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Callahan, 40 Ind. App. 223,
81 N. E. 670; Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307
Mo. 520, 271 S. \V. 497, 39 A. L. R. 1001;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
Tietke v. Forrest, 64 Cal. App. 364, 221 P.

681.''

In Schaff v. Coyle, 249 Pac. 947, the supreme Court
of Oklahon1a held the trial .court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's motion to make plaintiff's petition more definite and certain:
''For reversal, it is first insisted that the trial
.court erred in overruling defendant's motion
to require the plaintiffs to make their petition more definite and certain. Motions to
make more definite and certain are addressed
to the .sound dis-cretion of the trial court, and
where, as in this case, the information sought
to be ohtained thereby is within the knowledge of the defendant, and can be obtained
from records, train sheets, switch lists, reports, and other documentary evidence, kept
by the defendant, s'howing the mo.vement of
its various trains and engines, this court cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling such action. City of
Lawton v. Hills, 53 Okla. 243, 153 P. 297; Ft.
Smith & Western R.y. Go. v. Ketis, 26 Okla.
696, 110 P. 616·1; Landon v. Morehead, 34
Okla. 701, 126 P. 1027; City of Chickasha v.
Looney, 36 Okla. 155, 129 P. 136; Frey v.
F 1ailes, 37 Okla. 297, 132 P. 342."
1

III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE AMERICAN
EQUITABLE

ASSURANCE

COMPANY

HAD

NO

CLAIM

AGAINST COVEY GARAGE.

At page 44 of appellant's brief it is stated that ''it
was stipulated (Ab. 11) that the American Equitable As·
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surance Company paid to plaintiff under a collision
coverage polic.y, the amount of his loss under the policy.''
The so-called stipulation w'hich was little more than an
argument is found at pages 35-38 of the record. Mr.
Stewart stated that the amount paid by American Equitble Assurance Company to Mr. Romney ''is substantially
less than the amount we have stipulated should be recovered in the event there is a recovery.'' Plaintiff objected to the n1ateriality of the proposed stipulation and
the court never ruled on the objection, and plaintiff did
not stipulate that the insurance company had paid anything to Mr, Romney.
But assuming that the insurance company had paid
a portion· of plaintiff's loss, there is no error in the
judgment for plaintiff. It must be observed that the
American Equitable Assurance Company is a party defendant in the action. It was served with an order of
the •cDurt requiring it to ''appear and set forth its rights
and daims, if any, against defendant Covey Garage.''
It did not file any pleading or assert any claim. It is,
therefore, idle to review the cases or discuss the question
of whether or not it is a necessary party.
And when the insurance company is made a party
to the action it is obviously not prejudicial to the defendant Covey Garage that it asserts no claim against
that defendant.
/Such is the doctrine clearly stated in Potomac Insu.raucc Co. v. Nickson, 64 U. 395, 231 Pac. 445, where the
.eourt said :
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''Plaintiff was lia·ble t(} Vvallace, and paid the loss
and damage he sustained by reason of the
defendant's breach of duty, that is, by reason
of his wrongful delivery of the car to WeiQ_ers. Nor is it controlling that the plaintiff
was liable only in case of theft and not for
misdelivery. That was the effect of the
contract as between the plaintiff and Walla~.
With that the defendant is not concerned except that he has a right to be protected
ag-ainst paying the loss to more than one
claimant. As to that he is fully protected
both by the proof of the assignment by Wallace to fhe plaintiff and also by the fact tha.t
plaintiff paid the loss to Walla,ee and was
subrogated to his rights as against the defendant.''
With the relationship between Romney and the insurance company the Covey Harage is "not concerned''
and the judgment protects it against "paying the loss
to more than one claimant.''

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY OVERRULED DE-FENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO THE TESTI!MONY OF THE WI'IINESS
SQUIRES THAT HIS CAR HAD BEEN STOLEN FROM THE
COVEY GARA:GE ON FEBRUARY 26, 1938.

The testimony of Mr. Squires was admissible to
show notice to defendant that on a Saturday night about
two months prior to the theft of the Romney ca.r, thr
Squires car had been stolen from the garage. Whether
or not the prior theft had resulted from negligence was
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not in issue in this ease and the prior t lwft was no tiel'
regardless of whether or not it wa~ lll'g;ligently permitted 'by the bailee. H u.rd r. U. P. Ry. Co., 8 Utah 241,
30 Pac. 982, is cited by appellant.
This court clearly illustrates the distinction here
involved when it stated:
·' \Y e think the ruling of the district court was

correct, and was not in conflict with the case
of District of Colu.mbia v. Armes, 107 U. S.
5:24, :2 Sup. -Gt. R,ep. 840, as contended by
counsel for appellant. That was a case to
recover dan1ages for injuries from a fall,
caused by a defective sidewalk in the city of
\V ashington. The sidewalk had been left in
an unguarded and dangerous condition, and
the court held that plaintiff might show that
while it was in that condition other like accidents had oecurred at the same place, for
the reason that it tended to show the dangerous character of the place; and that, from
the publicity neeessarily given such accidents,
it tended also to show that the citv authorities had notice of the dangerous ch-aracter of
the locality. If testimony, however, had been
offered that other people had fallen on other
sidewalks in the city, we think the court would
not have held it admissible."
The Supreme Court of California, in McCormick v.
Great Western Po·wer Co., 8 P. (2d) 145, stated the rule
as follows:
''Furthermore, it is held in this state that, for
the purpose of proving that one who maintains a dangerous instrumentality might·
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reasonably anticipate that persons eng-aO'ed
in lawful occupations, in places where they
~ave a legal right to be, are likely to be inJured thereby, evidence of previous accidents
similar in character to the one in question
and not too remote therefrom in place or point
of time, is admissible. Long v. John Brenner
Co., 36 Cal. App. 630, 172 P. 1132, 1136; Gorman v. County of Sacramento, g2 Gal. App.
656, 268 P. 1083, 1087; Dyas v. Southern Pacific Co., 140 Cal. 2g·6, 73 P. g72. In the Long
Case, in holding that evidence of similar accidents was admissible, the court said: '\Ye
think the evidence was admissible upon the
general proposition that testimony of previous accidents similar to the one in question
not only tends to show the dangerous chara~
ter of the place, but, where the previous acddents have occurred under substantially the
same general circum·stances of the subsequent accident, tends to disclose the cause of
the latter, and, furthermore, tends to bring
home to the person maintaining the place
where the in•jury occurred knowledge of t~e
dangerous condition of such plaice.' And m
the Gorman Case the following language was
used:' Appellant next contends that the court
erred in permitting respondent to introduce
evidence that other accidents had occurred
at thi~ bridge; that is, that at least four automobiles had fallen off of this bridge into t1Je
canal prior to the time the boy was drowned.
We think the evidence was properly admitted
as tending to show the dangerous character
of the bridge and the cause of the boy'~
death, and furthermore, 1t tends to bring
home to appellant knowledge of the dan~er
ous condition of said bridge.' ''
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And in Sar.rJcnt r. Cuion Fuel Co., :~7 Utah i~~l:~, 10~

P. 928, the Supren1e Court of Utah said:
''()yer defendant's objections, plaintiff was permitted to sl!ow that rock and earth had fallen
from the roof of the tunnel at different times
prior to the accident, and at places other than
the place of the accident. vV e see no error in
these rulings. :Such evidence was admissible
as tending to show the character of the
ground, the necessity of timbering or otherwise supporting the roof, and notice to t11e
defendant of the defectiYe and dangerous
conditions.''

Osplind v. Pea.rce, 221 N. W. 679 and Marnson v.
Mays Department Stores Co., 71 S. W. (2d) 1081, announce the same rule. The question involved is answered
in the cases by an appeal to common sense. Does the
proof of the prior occurrence tend to show or support .
an inference that the defendant was negligent on the
occasion in question. \Ye believe that if the evidence
showed that a car was stolen from defendant's garage
every Saturday night for two months that even the ·defendant would admit it was not exercising due care.
The illustration differs from the facts here only in degree
which goes to the weight and not the. admissibility.
Under its assignment of error No.6 appellant argues
that an agent has no authority, after an event or transaction has occurred to make admissions on behalf of his
principal, and that the testimony of Mr. Squires as to
the prior theft was therefore hearsa'y and inadmissible.
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Mr. Squires testified that he parked his car on Saturday night and when he called for his car and presented
his che.ck on Sunday m·orning the attendant did not delin'r the car. The man in charge at the garage "took
me all through the garage in an effort to locate my car
and then he told me I couldn't claim it.'' The attendant
and the manager told :Mr. Squires the car had been
driven out the night before alhout 11 :50 and that it h.ad
not been located; that they didn't know where it was;
that they had reported it to the Police Department of
Salt Lake City.
When it is remembered that this testim·ony was offered only for the purpose of showing notice of the prior
theft and not for the purpose of showing any negligence
· upon the prior ·occasion it is apparent that the statements
of the attendant a-nd manager were not hearsay. The
statements were not offered for the purpose of proving
the truth of their content, which was not in issue in this
case.

The mere fact of their statements, together with

the undisputed testim·ony of Squires that he and the attendant went all through the garage in a fruitless effort
to find his .car, proves the defendant knew of the ~act
that the ;Squires car was taken out of the garage without
the claim check being delivered. Perhaps the statements
of the attendants add nothing to the facts observed and
testified to by Squires that his car was not in the garage
when he called for it and if so its adn1ission was harm·
less, even if the case had

be~n

tried by a jury.
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The situation is YPry similar to that before this court
in the recent case of Goldetl l'. American Keene Cnn('ilf
& Plaster Co., 95 P. (2d) 755. \Yith respect to the admissibility of certain letters not signed by or on behalf
of the party against ·whonl they were offered the rou rt
said (Mr. Justice Pratt):
''They were not hearsay as they were not offered
as proof of their content, but were offered as
proof of a course of conduct indicative of an
intention to supervise the acts of the Cement
Company.''
With respect to the statements of an ag·ent binding
the principal :
"Therefore he (the principal) is bound by the
conversations of that agent within the scope
of that agency. That statements are made
against the interest of the principal is not
ground for ruling out the answer.''
If the view is taken that the statements of the attendants were admissible only if their content was the
only thing about them of probative value then it is submitted they are admissible as being within the apparent
and implied scope of the authority of the agent. Surely
the attendant on duty at the garage when a person calls
~or

his car and presents a claim che.ck and the car can

not be found has authority to tell the owner that it had
been driven out the night before and not located and
reported to the police.
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The headnote in Hemminger v. Tri-State Lumber Co.
(Idaho), 68 P. (2d) 54, states:

''In libel action based on pulblication of list of
unsatisfactory accounts compiled by secretary of organization of which defendants
were members and which allegedly was responsible for publication, testimony that
secretary stated to witnesses that number
be'hind each name on list was number of businesses that turned name in and that she
stated from whom she received list held admissible as primary evidence, since secretary
was, for the special purpose, agent of person£
·who caused her to compile and publish list,
and her statement. stood on same footing as
if made by defendants.''
In Germa11ln v. Huston, 23 N. E. ('2d) 371, the court
held:
"While one witness was permitted to testify that
he reported to defendant's janitor s-ometime
prior to plaintiff's injury that children had
been playing wjth and on the rope and .had
been sliding down same, the court sustamed
defendant's objections to other ·evidence offered by plaintiff as to previous accidents
to children playing on the rope as well as to
complaints mude to and statements of t~e
janitor concerning children playing wit~ s.a1d
rope. This evidence was dearly admissible
and competent to show that defendant knew
or 1by the exercise of ordinary care could have
known of the attractive and dangerous charac·
ter of the rope and pulley apparatus. 'It ha~
frequently been held that evidence of othei
accidents by the same agency in the same con
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dition is con1petent, not for the purpose of
showing independent acts of negligence, but
for the limited purpose of showing that the
unsafe thing or condition causing the partieular accident caused others, and that the
occurrence of suc.h other accidents tends to
show notice to the owner of such dangerous
agency. M·oore v. Bloomington, De-catur &
Champaign Railroad Co., 29·5 Ill. 63, 128 N. E.
721; City of Chicago v. Jarvis, 226 Ill. 614,
80 N. E. 1079; City of Bloomington v. Legg,
151 Ill. 9, 37 N. E. 696, 42 Am. St. Rep. 2'16.'
W olczek Y. Public Service Go., 342 Ill. 482,
174 N. E. 577, 585."
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
Junn, RAY, QuiNNEY

&

NEBEKER,

Attorneys f1or Respondent.
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